THE FETTERED MEDIA

CONTROLLING PUBLIC DEBATE

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Twentieth century dictatorships have been distinguished by the manner in which they can avail themselves of the technical and cultural potential of methods of mass persuasion. Using modern media, they perpetuate their rule and instrumentalize and establish hegemony through institutionalized ideologies. Societies of the "Soviet type,"[1] such as the GDR, generally fit this description. During the GDR's existence, the SED party and the state apparatus utilized traditional and modern forms of mass media and their institutional, substantive, and argumentative forms of control to secure and further their power. The media's potentially stabilizing effects are obvious, and have been remarked upon by authors who subscribe to totalitarian theories of rule[2] as well as by representatives of more critically oriented theoretical models.[3] While the former focus on aspects of centralized control and analyze the processes by which the state can implement canonized points of view to the exclusion of dissenting opinions, the latter emphasize those aspects of centralized forms of media that are "seductive," and capable of mobilizing the masses. Both perspectives are not necessarily exclusive, and are in fact interdependent.[4]

The historical "modernity" of the GDR as a particular form of dictatorship cannot be captured exclusively in these terms. Methods of media control were not just highly functionalized and orchestrated from above. Instead, media politics in the GDR were

complex and ambiguous, composed of different, and at times, contradictory elements such as planning, control and party evaluation. The result of these policies was the appearance of "censorship without censors."[5] By establishing certain standards of behavior and other mechanisms of control, the state and the party could delegate censorship downwards to journalists, artists, and politicians. These individuals became in the process both rulers and the ruled, integrated as they were within the apparatus of power and simultaneously faced with the representations of social reality they encountered on a daily basis.

At the same time, claims to "totalitarian" rule inevitably lead to questions about their actual limits, and point to the possibility of resistance, the existence of oppositional or contradictory developments, and the significance of internal conflicts inherent within the system itself. These contradictions stem largely from the fact that media have unintentional results that are often extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control. In the following essay, the authors will describe the mechanisms of regulation and control in the GDR and analyze the influence of West German media in the East to discuss the dimensions of control, resistance and transgression in East German press, radio, TV, film, and literature.[6]

Instruments of Regulation and Control

Not only the GDR press, but East German radio, television, film, as well as publishing and the book trade were all centrally organized monopolies. Producing and distributing their products on a large scale, they were part of a differentiated, complex system of manipulation and regulation that secured claims to total control through various means. Within this complex, roughly four different systems of rule can be distinguished: first, the practice of repressive personnel policies and restrictive recruitment; second, the establishment of a centrally organized institutional structure with a multilevel planning system; third, the distribution of current topics and programs as well as the regulation of language (so-called weekly "arguments"); and finally methods of surveillance through censorship and Stasi activities.[7]

Radio and Television

East German radio and television stood under a particularly strict system of party control. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of NS rule, the Soviet military administration in Germany (SVAG) had subjected radio to a system of censorship and review before

and after broadcasting (pre- and post-censorship). These authorities gradually transferred responsibility for radio into German hands until 1949.

In 1952 a "State Radio Committee" was established within the Council of Ministers (SRK) which was based on Soviet models. This committee replaced the previous general board of management and became the central instrument of control for radio, and until 1968 for television as well.[8] At the same time the federal states had to give up their own stations and cancel their own programming, thereby reducing them to mere regional studios. They were replaced by three centralized programs, produced by so-called "cross-sectional" editors. All of these measures were aimed at securing effective control of the media. But radio became less popular due to omnipresent political propaganda and the uniformity of programming. Starting in spring 1953, therefore, the state reversed some of these measures. Programming was reorganized along more horizontal lines with three relatively independent stations, forming a stable organization that was to remain in place from 1956 until the GDR's demise.[9]

The Planning System, set up as early as 1950, was an important instrument in the concrete realization of specific programming. In conjunction with the Division for Press and Television, the SRK laid out guidelines scheduling programming up to six weeks in advance. According to the rules established by the "Central Guidelines," the editors were to draw up their own programming in conjunction with the SRK, which then had to approve the contents. This mid-range planning was supplemented by short-term scheduling that had to be approved two weeks before programs were aired. The amount of air time that editors actually had at their disposal was therefore very limited.[10]

Another important means the SED had at its disposal to transform radio into an instrument of rule was personnel policy. Appointments were linked to ideological criteria. In the years 1949–1952, radio saw a comprehensive purge that removed "class enemies and questionable elements." Those affected were many former western emigrants in leading positions accused of the "English disease" (i.e., liberalism and pluralistic tendencies) or "ideological negligence" (i.e., criticism of conditions and developments in the GDR or the Soviet Union and the use of Western sources).[11] These measures also affected numerous lower-level employees, technicians, and musicians, who refused to move to the Eastern sector of Berlin or who displayed any disdain at all for Stalinist policies. These steps were typical for the period, related as they were to the SED's restructuring as a "party of the new order" and to the Stalinist purges. Their scale nevertheless illustrates how sig-

nificant the party thought of journalists as "functionaries of the working class."

Starting in the 1960s, such "harsh" disciplinary actions were replaced with a system of punishments and rewards aimed at integrating journalists into the ruling apparatus. Well into the 1980s the party punished any straying from the official line, nonconformist thought, or "moral lapses" with sanctions that had potentially damaging consequences. Nevertheless, criminal prosecution or public humiliation of suspected offenders were more the exception than the rule. Instead, the party actively promoted conformity in an attempt to avoid public controversy, and officials sought to steer individuals in the right direction through preventive "career talks."[12]

The recruitment and socialization of a new generation of professionals was another element of the party's personnel policy that subordinated radio to the ruling party. Starting in the 1950s, almost all journalists had to complete their studies at Leipzig University.[13] Admission was limited, while ideological concerns took center stage. This emphasis on indoctrination stood in direct conflict with demands for more objective qualifications. The state determined individual career paths and job choices once studies were completed.[14] Journalists' ideological leanings also played a key role in their relationship to the party and other organizations. At least two thirds of all journalists were members of the "Association of East German Journalists" (VDJ).[15] A large percentage also belonged to the SED and could be directed through party groups. The threat of party hearings often squelched potential criticism at a very early stage.[16]

Hindered structurally by these mechanisms, opposition and dissidence could not easily find expression in East German radio. But even those journalists who toed the party line were not always capable of recognizing and following the intentions of party leaders. To meet this need, weekly "arguments" were organized by leaders of the party's agitation division starting in 1952. Officially these meetings, which all of Berlin's chief media editors attended, were designed to provide answers to recent debates and controversies. In reality, however, the meetings functioned as instruments for the creation of binding rules of discourse, identifying those subjects considered off limits as well as those issues the party wished to emphasize. Supplied with detailed specifics and formal rules of procedure, editors were charged with realizing these goals in their programming, even if these specifics were euphemistically deemed mere "recommendations."[17]

As these examples illustrate, East German media manipulation was not based on pre- or post-broadcast censorship in a classical

sense. The reasons for this practice are obvious: the range of media available in an industrialized society made wide-ranging censorship impossible. Such censorship was unnecessary, since the lack of political independence and the effectiveness of preventive measures made direct censorship superfluous. Concentrated efforts from above were seldom necessary.[18] The one exception to this rule were the church newspapers, because they were removed from open political influence. At the same time, however, a complex system of permanent controls secured the preventive effects of most indirect methods of rule.

The role of the state security system in the media remains unclear.[19] Officially the Stasi was responsible for the "operative security" of all technology, such as the prevention of acts of sabotage against radio transmitters or newspaper presses. The Stasi was not generally responsible for substantive issues, unless printing mistakes or broadcasting errors were interpreted as deliberate acts. The most important means of control at their disposal was the "political-operative" subordination of personnel carried out at two different levels. Employing methods similar to those implemented in other institutions, the Stasi upheld official contacts to "leading cadres" and also worked with unofficial informants. A 1969 directive that called for the examination of journalists for "ideological lapses," "the spread of oppositional views," or questionable "moral behavior" was probably related to events surrounding the Prague Spring.[20]

Printing and Publishing

Books belonged, as did newspapers and magazines, to the so-called "basic needs of the population," and thus were supported by considerable state subsidies. Starting in the 1960s, a specialized publishing system consisting of about eighty different publishing firms produced 6,000 titles per year, with about 1,200 in the non-fiction category. The State Commission for the Arts, much hated by producers for its dogmatic and often incompetent decisions, was abolished in the reforms following the events of 17th June 1953. The responsibilities for central control and direction were taken over by the Ministry of Culture in January 1954. In a complicated process that extended over a number of years, an independent Office for Literature and Publishing, created in 1951, emerged.[21] Still part of the Ministry of Culture in 1956, it became the Chief Administration for Publishing and the Book Trade by 1963. With a staff of a few dozen it planned and controlled the production, distribution, and reception of books until the fall of the East German state. Its chief instrument of control was the five-year and one-year plans which established various cultural "themes" and "accents."

The most important measure at the disposal of the *Hauptver-waltung* was the so-called "reviews." The word *Begutachtung* was an invention of real-existing socialism and stands for the censorship that had been officially banned by the constitution. These reviews applied to all areas of publishing, from children's books and educational materials, to novels, poetry, dramas, and even calendars.[22] The complex process of covert censorship was termed the "printing approval process." It followed the established rules of cultural politics, that is it demanded socialist–realist literature follow party lines. Decisions were based on an "aesthetics of the choice of subject matter and heroes,"[23] while literature with militaristic, pornographic, "decadent," or "modernist" content and form was forbidden. The ZK division responsible for culture and science, the SED's representative in this area, provided the necessary political and ideological guidelines.

Conflicts did occur between politics, ideology, and the economy when state-sponsored literature – such as the so-called factory reports – had to be pulled because of their realistic portrayal of actual working conditions. Some stories were canceled when apologetic or affirmative literature proved to be economically less than lucrative. These tensions attest to the contradictions between "planning and censorship."[24]

The print media were constantly plagued by shortages in the paper and printing industries. Problems worsened dramatically starting in the 1970s. The GDR did have a high number of publications relative to its population, but the state could not meet its printing demands to produce daily and weekly newspapers and illustrated magazines. In the mid-1980s, for instance, the popular journal *Wochenpost* could not fill its 100,000 orders.[25]

The Film Industry

In order to control the complicated processes involved in film-making the state had created central direction and control agencies in 1949. These soon proved to be extremely ineffective in maintaining the industrial and technical infrastructure, implementing political strategies, planning, realizing and controlling production, and in distribution.[26] Hampered by excessive bureaucratic centralization and rigid ideological norms, film production sank in the years 1952 and 1953. Studios produced only six and then eight films per year.

In the wake of the June 1953 crisis, the Chief Office for Film (HV Film) was created in the newly founded Ministry for Culture. This office was responsible for the development of yearly production and "thematic" guidelines for projects. It could thus control the content and form of studio productions (for feature-length movies, docu-

mentaries and shorts, popular scientific movies and animated films) made under the DEFA monopoly (Deutsche Film Aktiengesellschaft). These plans also had to be approved by the Politburo. Special sections of the HV Film reviewed specific film projects in conjunction with the Central Committee, handed out licenses for filming, set the number of copies for each film and even regulated the number of allotted cinema showings. When films had particularly political messages, such as the two-part, feature-length movie on the Communist hero Ernst Thälmann, representatives of the Politburo even "reviewed" the scripts and the films. The Division for Agitation in the SED's Central Committee was generally responsible for the cinematic weekly news show "The Eyewitness," as well as for documentaries. This division also supervised the distribution of films in conjunction with the Distribution Commission. HV Film finally was co-responsible for the different divisions within the state broadcasting system, such as the dramatic arts (two-thirds of all DEFA films produced in the 1970s and 1980s were made-for-TV movies).

During the 1950s, the different studios developed a system of control and review to guide them in searching for material and in evaluating future film projects. These procedures involved a complicated process of checks and negotiations between artists and the control agencies of the studios on the one hand and with the film agencies and responsible party divisions on the other. Borrowing from practices established in the theater, studios making feature films and documentaries (as well as different divisions of television) hired "politically reliable" dramaturgs. In their central positions within the studios, these dramaturgs could ensure a high degree of pre-broadcast censorship. Projects were looked over by the studio leadership before being sent to the HV Film for "review." In cases of particular political significance, these sessions could even take place in the presence of ZK members.

The centralized nature of film production and distribution included many different factors and the Ministry of Culture was not the sole administrative control agency. The HV Film had to cooperate with other ministries and agencies, and work through party channels up to the highest levels of the leadership. This influenced the availability of financial and technical resources, the training of artistic and technical personnel, as well as the support of competent bureaucrats within the film agencies. Such procedures not only had an impact on marketing strategies, but also determined how movie theaters were equipped and films distributed. Lastly this structure also guided mass produced works in community centers and film clubs, party and mass organizations, and even international cultural exchanges.

Western Media Influence

The role which Western media played in the GDR can hardly be over-emphasized, since it constituted a kind of "second" media that constantly influenced and subverted the "first", i. e., official GDR media. Consequently, GDR media were increasingly forced into a defensive position vis-à-vis their challengers from the West that belied their public claims to superiority. This "double media land-scape"[27] permanently undermined the credibility of SED informa-tion policies and strengthened popular acceptance of Western media. Despite the party's elaborate and complicated process of control, the SED was constantly in an inferior position. Instead of setting their own agenda, they were forced to respond to issues and measures established by the Federal Republic.[28] The roots of this defensiveness were to be found East Germany's unique situation that set it apart from all other communist-ruled systems in Central and Eastern Europe. In spite of claims to the contrary, the state never had a monopoly of the media in the GDR. It is commonplace to note that radio waves and satellite signals transcend borders.

Decisive for the situation in the GDR was that the Western media did not have to overcome cultural or language barriers.[29] It was a daily habit for most GDR citizens to inform themselves about the West, but also about their own country, from a variety of sources. They took divergent, and often contradictory pieces of information and pieced them together to form a whole.[30] West Ger-man television and radio programming occupied a central position in this process, because they offered valuable information about the West that citizens could not obtain otherwise due to the restric-tions on travel. Western sources also reported on those events and processes in the GDR that went unreported in the East. Perceptions about the West were not exclusively formed by information gleaned from the media, however. Reports from people with travel permits, memories of life before the Wall, and other sources of information also played an important role.

No official data exist concerning the spread or acceptance of Western radio programs in the GDR. But the audience-share reached by GDR stations can allow us to speculate about the large dissemination and acceptance of Western programs in the East.[31] In the early years of television, in the late 1950s, approximately 60 percent of GDR citizens could theoretically receive Western pro-gramming.[32] In the 1980s this number had risen to 80 percent.[33] Only the northern-most areas of East Germany around Rostock and southeastern areas near Dresden remained unable to receive pro-gramming, and these regions were therefore popularly referred to

as the "valleys of the clueless." West German radio could be received in wide areas since the 1960s. The actual use of Western media was widespread at all times.[34] In the Federal Republic, on the other hand, due to technical difficulties, only about 15 percent of all households could view GDR television. And only a small minority (16 percent) actually took advantage of this opportunity daily or several times a week.[35]

From the beginning, competition between the Federal Republic and the GDR was carried out on the air. During the Cold War both sides sought to win over the population of the other side and to dis-credit their "opponents" by often highly exaggerated propaganda claims.[36] Nevertheless, the West soon gained an advantage, while East German media were increasingly forced into the defensive. This defensiveness not only characterized the provision of the nec-essary technical infrastructure, but also forms of programming and their conceptualization, as well as program content.

The government was repeatedly forced to mobilize extra resources to stop Western stations from supplying the East with programming, or receiving better quality signals than GDR pro-grams. The forced expansion of television in the East was also linked to previous developments in the Western zones.[37] The GDR was continually behind – whether in broadcasting technology, the number of receivers in use, or in the implementation of new stan-dards such as FM radio, stereo, or color television – and always try-ing to catch up with the "big brother" in the West who continued to set the standards.[38]

The situation regarding program content was marked by similar difficulties. In TV's early years, producers could hardly make enough shows to meet demand. Producers in the Federal Republic solved this problem by distributing the burden of the first state television channel among the members of the federally structured ARD net-work (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstal-ten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*). In the GDR television was centralized for political reasons. Although GDR TV aired the first official test program a few days before that of its competitor in the West (21 December 1952, as opposed to 26 December 1952), the transition to regular programming took place a full year later than in the FRG.[39] It was October 1969 before the GDR could implement a second television channel (the FRG already had three channels), and it still did not possess the necessary production capacities.[40]

Many GDR television programs, especially in the area of light entertainment, copied successful West German formats (that were in turn often copies of successful American shows). But political programs also often borrowed formally from West German models.

Thus the news program *Aktuelle Kamera* was based on the West German *Tagesschau*; the roundtable discussion entitled "Meeting Point Berlin" with foreign journalists copied Werner Höfer's "International Breakfast"; the critical news show *Prisma*[41] had both *Panorama* and *Report* as spiritual godfathers, while Karl-Eduard v. Schnitzler's famous "Black Channel"[42] also had a western precursor – "Red Spectacles" by Thilo Koch.[43]

Just how much the hegemony of the East German media was undermined by the West becomes even more clear when considering the level of content. The bloody repression of the Chinese student protest movement at Tienamen Square in summer 1989 was at first not noted in the GDR media. But a large portion of GDR citizens was informed about events through Western television or radio. In reaction to Western coverage, GDR media attempted to interpret the event as a victory over "counter-revolutionary forces."[44] This reaction probably led the East German public to question the credibility of GDR media further. In any case, the state's continued claims to an absolute information monopoly had grown absurd. East German reporting was continually forced to react implicitly or explicitly to Western sources, although the media often used vague formulations to avoid directly quoting the West.[45]

SED media policy was faced with an additional problem: the goal of "mass solidarity" could not be achieved by programs with political–ideological content. In other words: entertainment and advice shows – which at least formally had little ideological content – enjoyed the highest ratings, while propaganda broadcasts such as the "Black Channel" had a limited viewership that continually declined over time. Their formal and empty nature was a hindrance to public acceptance. Owing its longevity to political circumstances, this rhetorical style proved to be an internal weakness that could not be remedied, despite repeated complaints about the unattractiveness of GDR news shows.[46] GDR media enjoyed its greatest successes in terms of viewership when programmers abandoned their claims to spread propaganda, and when shows closely followed Western formats.[47]

The GDR state's claim to speak for all of Germany – a policy upheld until the beginning of the 1970s – only intensified this problem. Programming ostensibly had the goal of convincing citizens in the West of the superiority of Ulbricht's brand of socialism. To achieve this goal, three radio programs and a series of different television shows targeted Western audiences. These programs competed directly with Western shows. The resulting contradictions could not remain hidden for long, as can be seen by the example of the pirate radio "Freedom Station 904." Functioning in the West as

the voice of the banned Communist party, the station used popular music programming, modeled on Radio Luxembourg.[48] Internally this policy increasingly came under attack. It appeared paradoxical to forbid the reception of Western channels while simultaneously offering a program similar to precisely what had been forbidden. Gerhart Eisler's response to this criticism was apodictic – it was not the music, but the words, that determined the quality of any given radio program.[49]

The fact that GDR media were increasingly put on the defensive also stemmed from a policy dictated by ideological premises. In the 1940s and 1950s, as communist rule began to stabilize, first the press and radio, then television and film were part of the larger system of domination.[50] Following classical Marxist thought, these media were instruments that would, through propaganda and agitation, spread the ideology of the party as a "collective organizer." This concept, originating with Lenin, was unsuited to the postwar German situation for several reasons. First, it falsely assumed media's direct and linear effect. Second, it did not differentiate between audio-visual and print media, but relied at times almost exclusively on the press. Third, it did not consider the possibilities of a media that could cross political borders. And fourth, it ignored public demands to be "entertained."[51] Despite these limitations, the state persisted with such a "normative communication policy" until the middle of the 1960s.[52]

At times policies towards the media were accompanied by attempts to restrict reception of Western programming. This included sending out disruptive signals, or campaigns against roof antennas directed towards the West. Citizens were encouraged to turn in and denounce neighbors and co-workers suspected of watching Western television. Such measures peaked with the erection of the Wall in 1961, but were abandoned shortly thereafter. Although the reception of Western shows was never explicitly forbidden, listeners and viewers could be persecuted for "spreading inflammatory information" or "conveying information threatening to the state." Yet the leadership consistently refused to outlaw viewing directly or to install widespread technical measures hindering reception because of their fears of popular protest or unrest.[53]

Starting in the 1970s a relative reorientation in media politics occurred. The reception of Western programming was officially approved, television and radio were recognized as service and entertainment industries and actively supported in the 1980s. However, this new outlook could not alter the larger, underlying problems. Centralization and government control of media hindered necessary reforms and developments, such as much-needed region-

alization. Most importantly, the party retained its claims to "guide" press and radio directly. In the fall of 1989 the editors of *Aktuelle Kamera* complained that until the end of the GDR programming had been treated like a "preview of the *Neues Deutschland*," while the specific nature of a news show, namely its topicality, had been consistently ignored.[54] Even more damaging was the fact that in the face of a worsening economic and social crisis, Eastern media continued its course of "journalistic optimism," while Western sources conveyed a negative, more ambivalent portrait of GDR society.[55]

In retrospect it seems that journalists provided politicians with exactly the picture of the East German state the latter wanted to see. The *Aktuelle Kamera* and other politically-oriented programs increasingly became "target shows" for functionaries in the state and party bureaucracy. They provided leaders with important information, orientation, and identification. For the majority of the population, however, they offered a representation of reality that was radically different from daily perceptions, and delivered political messages that were simplistic and without substance. The result was a fundamental lack of credibility: viewer ratings for the *Aktuelle Kamera* sank between 1981 and 1988 from 14 percent to a mere 9.5 percent. And on 1 May 1989, ratings for the program *Schwarzer Kanal* reached a new nadir of 0.5 percent.[56]

Viewer rejection of GDR offerings cannot simply be explained away with references to the competition offered by Western media. The so-called "uses and gratification approach"[57] offers a more helpful explanation. This perspective interprets the use of resources according to the gratification they provide. Most East German people did not expect any gratification from the media. In fact reality as presented there created a certain cognitive dissonance in the face of personal perceptions that completely contradicted media images.[58] This theory also helps explain why many viewers rejected programs with explicit political content, while continuing to watch entertainment shows and self-help programs. Such shows helped people come to terms with the demands of daily life, if only by enabling them to put such cares behind them for a brief moment.[59]

The Arts and the Public

In accordance with the dictatorial nature of GDR society, the publics created by the arts were thoroughly permeated by state control.[60] Since the term public sphere cannot be applied in the Habermasian sense – democratic and normative – to East Germany, it must be used in a neutral, descriptive, empirical, and historical sense. Such

terms as "system immanent,"[61] "party public,"[62] "official public spheres under party control,"[63] or "socialist public sphere"[64] have been used by historians and social scientists in an attempt to describe the complicated system of communicative spaces in the GDR. The public sphere is a complex network with various fragmented and interrelated dimensions. We have already discussed the second dimension that existed in East Germany, namely the competing public created by West German media. GDR sub-culture and counter-cultures made up a third dimension. The infiltration of these cultures by the state security system was not revealed until after the collapse of the East German state, and how this infiltration actually affected the production of art remains a contentious issue. Churches and their associated public spheres, with their sanctioned tolerance of medial and interpersonal forms of communication, represent another special case. In the 1980s, various political, social, and cultural groups used these spaces as public spheres.

The public spheres created by the arts should be conceptualized as "partial public spheres" that represented "contested areas of control" because they were "placed in a central position in the antechamber of power."[65] But in the area of artistic and cultural production the internal rules of art production could result in tendencies that stood in opposition to official norms and dogmas. Cultural public spheres in the GDR were marked by ideological and aesthetic concepts of struggle (socialist realism, decadence), the universalization of discourses, and a distinct lack of public and open discussion.

The less audio–visual media and the press concerned themselves with the interests, needs and experiences of GDR citizens, the more other forms of expression gained in significance. Therefore the fine arts, literature, film, and the theater (and the sciences, as well) assumed informal and communicative "substitute functions"[66] that determined their rather significant position in society and secured for their producers and publics a large degree of prestige. Here also lie the roots of general public attitudes that saw literary intellectuals as "representatives" who could speak for those without voices.

Partial public spheres depended to a large degree on local, medial, institutional and organizational as well as individual factors. Questions about who could write about what subject, when, in which literary journal, and in which manner said a great deal about the degree of control as well as the development of individual styles. A literary discussion about a single work could take on many different forms, depending on whether it was carried out by the writers' association, the Academy of Arts, or within the party apparatus itself. An empirical study addressing these issues has yet to be written.[67] It also remains to be considered how the various partial

publics were related to each other and whether one can speak of "disjointed partial public spheres."[68] In the polyfunctional practice of art and culture, the compensatory, social–therapeutic, emancipatory, and anticipatory functions of art increased in the course of the 1970s, while the apologetic, politically affirmative and integrative effects of production steadily declined. This was reflected in literature and film, and in exhibition culture[69] and the theater.[70]

Movies and the Cinema

Due to their particular mimetic and visual qualities and their "collective" reception, feature length and documentary films represent a particular communicative field, separate from previously discussed structural factors and different from the individual reception of television. In the GDR, films were shown not only in cinemas, but at such venues as community centers, at mass events, and in film clubs. Due to claims for the "mass effects" of film, even industrial plants set up special showings or organized film prizes. Next to regular theater showings, distribution plans also included thematic film festivals and factory showings, such as the annual "Week of Soviet Films" or the "People's Democratic Films" meant to awaken the interest of the viewing public.

In contrast to television, the influence of the SED on DEFA's production of feature length and documentary films was less direct. It would be interesting to consider whether film production was on the whole more sensitive to changes within the domestic scene than television, which remained tied to its propagandistic functions. It does seem that filmmakers had greater leeway in making their movies, although this varied from project to project and from director to director. Nevertheless, the state monopoly of the DEFA remained, in the last instance, part of the larger system of direction and control. Caught within a net of mostly informal (thus unknown to those being watched) informants of the Stasi, the DEFA functioned within limits established by the state.[71] Film production illuminated a particular dilemma of dictatorial rule in the area of artistic production: how to use the productive potential of artistic individuality while holding more critical tendencies in check.

Despite the state's "caring supervision" of film production, state-sponsored films could, according to their form, content, or cultural political context, have other, unintended results. These meanings could be independent of such films' official purpose and in some circumstances even stand in opposition to them. It seems that many films possessed ambivalent, and at times even subversive significance for some viewers, who often read between the lines. When the control boards felt that films might not deliver their

intended results, they often planned "test viewings" in front of a pre-selected audience.

Looking back, however, GDR films' failings (both in content and form) were immense, and cumulative. Film producers were kept from addressing international aesthetic discourses or "sensitive topics" touching upon aspects of daily life, such as the presence of Soviet troops in East Germany. Any even remotely critical stance towards the Stalinist roots of the SED regime was barred by taboos and censorship. Institutionalized mistrust and a "continuity of suspicion" on behalf of the party and state apparatus towards the production of films often culminated in "collective" campaigns. In 1957, in the wake of the SED's "cultural political offensive," a movement against "revisionist" and "neutral" tendencies targeted the influence of Italian "neorealism" and the new Czech and Polish cinema.[72] Even those Soviet films that dared to express cautious criticism of Stalinist measures were restricted by suspicious GDR authorities.

In December 1965 the Eleventh Plenary of the Central Committee of the SED passed judgment on twelve DEFA feature films, which made up a large portion of the studio's yearly production. The event was unique in the history of DEFA and left a lasting impression on the artists involved. Those singled out by the party were film makers, actors, and mid-level managers who had dared to criticize the stagnation in society and politics prevalent in the GDR. The party's actions put an end to a discursive practice that could have worked against the basic affirmatory tendencies of GDR film.[73] These so-called "banned films" were shown in public only at the end of SED rule. The positive reactions of viewers to such critical views of society should not be overemphasized, yet they point to massive deficits in the communicative system of the GDR dictatorship.[74]

Nevertheless, the shift in the 1970s and 1980s towards everyday experiences in prose, theater, or DEFA films had its own long-term dynamic that was difficult to control. If on their way through the layers of bureaucratic control, film projects survived attempts to smooth out contradictions and erase criticisms, a not inconsiderable number preserved elements of "residual" social relevance. Topics previously not addressed (daily experiences such as youth criminality, aging, disease, death, poor housing conditions, homosexuality, or alternative lifestyles) began to be discussed in the 1970s. With postulates such as "the socialist way of life" or "general development" cultural differences could be addressed and expressed in new aesthetic forms.[75]

This was true not only for GDR feature films, but to a greater extent for documentaries which – as art forms – possessed more social relevance in the GDR than in West Germany.[76] Makers of doc-

umentaries may have had more difficulties than their colleagues in feature-length films in opposing the ruling paradigms of propaganda and agitational rule through nonfictional DEFA productions. But some documentaries could – at least compared to television with its largely affirmative message or feature films that enjoyed more attention from the party – offer a more critical view of GDR realities.[77]

On the other hand, established mechanisms of power did not prevent production of sometimes quite effective media events that crossed genres. It would be interesting to examine the effects of the adaptation of works of literature as radio programs, television films, or movies. So-called "TV novels," which drew on the narrative and aesthetic norms of feature length films and adapted them to television formats, were especially popular among viewers (such as the antifascist TV drama "Awakened Conscience" of 1961, or "Dr. Schlüter" of 1965–66).[78] Such attempts to create a particular television aesthetic and to experiment with dramatic forms remained undeveloped, especially during the second half of the 1960s when television dramas were reintegrated into the SED's party canon. "Ambitious party journalists, state functionaries or ZK members" assumed responsibility for writing TV dramas with relevant messages, and artistic projects were restricted largely to the adaptation of literature to television.[79]

After television became a true means of mass communication in the GDR, film producers at DEFA could develop specific forms of controlled entertainment and means of control. Their methods of production and program planning were highly flexible, although artistic innovation, particularly when compared to Western standards, remained relatively low. With varying degrees of success producers appropriated Western genres (love stories, science fiction and Westerns) that enjoyed wide popularity. These types of films generally followed concepts less susceptible to propagandistic messages and were often governed by economic interests (made for export).[80] Yet a shift in possible discourses allowed a more differentiated use of popular genres (especially in regards to antifascist themes or literature adaptations).

The SED viewed entertainment in the visual media as an ideological instrument of mass rule. This was more true for television than for film. But the state also saw visual media as a means of spreading knowledge about art and science to the people. Further studies are needed to determine the true integrative potential of GDR film and would need to focus more intensely on content and program analysis as well as consider popular reception.[81]

Conflicts that GDR filmmakers experienced between the opposing elements of "foreign influence and self-determination"[82] were

built into the very system of DEFA's film production. Unwilling to tolerate any institutional attempts to introduce pluralistic methods, the state did allow at times some timid steps in that direction. Decentralized film production groups, such as DEFA's "Artistic Workshop," consisted of a fixed cast of directors, cinematographers, dramatists, and actors. However, the repressive *Kahlschlag* Plenum of the SED's Central Committee in 1965 robbed such groups of their relative and partial economic independence. Restructured along party lines, they were often restocked with more "trustworthy" party members.[83]

The 1980s saw one last attempt to decentralize and liberalize film production. A group of young DEFA filmmakers – surrounded by "informal informants" of the state security system – worked out a plan for an alternative studio. The proposal of this "lost generation" had, however, already failed before it came before the public in 1988 at the last meeting of GDR filmmakers and television workers.[84]

The party's total control determined most of the associational activities of those working in film and television. The Association of Film and Television, founded in 1967, did offer a certain forum for communication among its members, but no fundamental critique of the basic forms of film production was possible. The GDR Academy of Arts allowed more room for discussion. There the president of the Academy Konrad Wolf, a DEFA film director, granted literature, poetry, and painting the same standing as film and television.

The most important forum for film in the GDR was the Documentary Film Festival in Leipzig, which had enjoyed international acclaim since 1957. A film festival for feature films similar to the West German Berlin *Berlinale* did not exist in the East. The Leipzig festival, therefore, had a rather ambivalent position from the very start. It served as advertising for the cultural policy of the GDR while simultaneously offering artists and those interested in film in the GDR a window to the international world of film. Open criticism of the system was not tolerated: "One never learned in Leipzig anything about the crimes of the past in socialist countries, or about what in other 'friendly states' of the Eastern block was already being served up as the truth," complained Christiane Mückenberger, former director of the festival. As late as 1988 organizers were not allowed to show Soviet programs containing elements of "Glasnost." The festival generally functioned as a catalyst between critical tendencies within DEFA documentaries and a small, elite public.[85]

After television had replaced the cinema as the leading visual medium, the 1960s saw the beginnings of local and university film clubs that functioned as communicative spaces. Initially charged with propagandistic goals, these clubs were meant to form public

taste in the service of the party. With time, however, such clubs organized individual programs aimed at specific groups and offered films different from regular cinema fare. Particularly starting in the late 1970s such clubs became increasingly critical. Within ten years their numbers had doubled, so that by the middle of the 1980s these "alternative" showings had more than 200,000 viewers.[86] It goes without saying that forbidden films were not included in the catalog of the State Film Archives for the film clubs.

Such partial public spheres may have done their part in encouraging and furthering critical readings of films and expressive methods of filmmaking. They were limited, however, by their exclusive nature (in the case of the festival) or as "sheltered" spaces (sheltered by self-censorship, social control, the Stasi, or control of the press) and were unable to achieve wider influence.

Literature

The public sphere associated with literature presents a special case, because "literature [was] one of the few links between the private and public spheres in the GDR."[87] As an "intermediary space,"[88] literature could function as a "substitute source of information" or as a kind of "substitute public sphere." Drawing on the tradition of social democratic pedagogy that placed emphasis on the spoken and printed word as a means of educating workers, literature enjoyed a high reputation in East Germany. Self-representations of the GDR as a "literature society" and "land of readers" as well as catch-phrases such as "an educated nation" underscore the cultural revolutionary claims of the SED regime. They also help to explain the characterization of the GDR as an educational and educating dictatorship.[89] The more problematic political culture became, the more literary culture – which had remained "a place of socialization and ideological legitimization" – became burdened by functions unrelated to literature.[90]

Studies carried out in the 1990s regarding daily encounters with culture in both German states have emphasized the differences between East and West that point to the lasting influence of cultural socialization and behavioral patterns inherited from the GDR dictatorship. Although the exaggerated claims to a "reading society" have proven untenable, it does deserve to be noted that East Germany had an "extensive reading public," distinguished from readers in the Federal Republic by its interests, range, purchasing practices, and library use.[91] The fact that the GDR enjoyed an extensive library system (97 percent of all communities had a state or communal library, including many exclusively for children or adolescents) which disappeared in the wake of reunification should be seen as the basis of this broad interest.

The more GDR literature could emancipate itself from party claims, the more readers turned to it as an essential "guide." The wide acceptance of literature and literary activities (whether in the FDJ, the trade unions, work brigades, domestic communities, in clubs and community centers, in the city, or in the country) had its roots in this development. Literature became a communicative object, a way to discuss individual and social problems. The more texts could critically address GDR realities, the more resonance authors and publishing houses enjoyed. This naturally resulted in an increased measure of control and surveillance, which was carried out broadly starting in 1969.[92]

In her short story "What is left," written in 1979 but published in 1990, Christa Wolf describes how secret surveillance and threat of control ruined creativity and communication. Her tale also highlights the discursive power of the public reading of any given text, which allowed participants of the public to find their own voices, despite their own fears. "In the last row a young women rose and introduced the word "future" into the discussion – a word against which we are all helpless, a word that is capable of changing the atmosphere of any room and moving any gathering. And if the words "Growth – Prosperity – Stability" had appeared in large bright letters on the wall, nothing could have helped more, because then the really important questions would have been addressed, the questions we live for and without which we could die."[93]

Claims to a "literature society" also implied the existence of a lively literary scene, boxed in between political mandates and official taboos. Stereotypical calls for more open discussion and a "free exchange of opinions" remained a staple in real-socialistic literary life. Actual controversial debates in the daily papers (such as those surrounding Erwin Strittmatter's *Ole Bienkopp* or Christa Wolf's *Der geteilte Himmel*) only took place in the 1960s, although calls were repeatedly made to revive them. The democratizing aspects of these discussions caused ruling dignitaries to view them as threatening. We have already seen by the example of the *Wochenpost* how "letters to the editor" could function as a substitute for democracy.[94]

The professionalization of literary criticism that had its roots in the 1960s reflected the political norms and canon of socialist realism, but with its more scientific and aesthetic criteria it resulted in an emancipation of GDR literature from simplistic propaganda. Starting in the 1970s authors turned to the realities of the concept of socialist realism, interpreting it in more open ideological terms and with literary originality.

In the forty years of their rule, GDR leaders preferred a literature of monosemy and were suspicious of lyrical or satirical genres. Lit-

erature of the Bitterfeld school with its all too realistic portrayals was also to prove a large stumbling block. Any criticism of the system was viewed as an "unfortunate occurrence" by GDR rulers and a "happy coincidence" by the ruled.

Ironies of Control

1989 saw the end of the GDR, and with it, the end of a system of fettered media that had determined the viewing, listening, and reading habits of the East German public. The SED, tied to antiquated, classically Marxist concepts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, could not effectively harness mass media in the service of its rule. The party's assumptions about the possibility of the "direct" and linear effects of the media proved to be inadequate. Nor could the party properly judge the actual situation of the media in East Germany and the growing import of audiovisual means of mass communication that cut across political borders and resulted in a highly differentiated and changing public.

The "supersystem"[95] erected by the SED state was characterized by a high degree of centralization and a complex structure of regulation and control that allowed little room for independent subsystems (typical of democratic societies) to develop. The state's methods of control determined and maintained a centrally organized media landscape that hindered change, differentiation, or adaptation. The SED's lack of flexibility and the continuity of its media policies attest to its concern for media's potentially disruptive powers.[96] It was typical for a "closed" system, such as that of the GDR, that calls for more public information became loudest during crisis situations, such as the June 1953 crisis. It was then that the state demanded a new media policy that would adequately serve the experiences and needs of the populace. Since media were considered the "party's best weapon," political concerns always won out over economic ones.

GDR media were therefore, in the end, deficient. Particularly in the face of international (Western) communicative standards and a growing sense of disbelief on behalf of the GDR population, these deficits increased tensions within society. The democratic aspects of modern mass culture (already noted by Walter Benjamin)[97] were held in check by the system's rigid structures and through internalized ideological criteria, which only emphasized the liberating effects of Western media for those in the East. Artistic public spheres, therefore, were of special significance in the GDR. But, as this essay suggests, there were numerous frictions there as well. In radio and television, where the methods of control were strict and

all-encompassing, Western media continually won "the war of the airwaves," though they could only be interpreted on an individual basis. When performers in other media such as literature, film, theater, cabaret, or painting attempted to address deficits, the state reacted with measures that continually threatened what little room for expression and artistic standards had been achieved.

The basic contradiction between the media's ideological and political functions and methods of control, as well as the necessity of understanding viewer reactions and interpretations, could never be satisfactorily resolved. The fact that narrow propagandistic methods of rule became increasingly obsolete is in large measure due to the very expansion of mass media and other modernization processes. The need to come to terms with the demands of a modern industrial state – which included the spread of audio-visual media – was in this sense (however unintentionally) incompatible with claims to totalitarian rule. It is in this manner that one can speak of an "interrupted or broken modernization" in the area of the media.

Attempts to interpret the SED's patterns of rule in the area of media exclusively under the aspect of total control are, however, too simplistic. Assuming that (particularly in the latter stages of its existence) the GDR repeatedly saw "rudimentary, individual elements that pointed to the possibility of a civil society,"[98] future research needs to concentrate on the inner dynamics, contradictions, and dysfunctionalities of the media in East Germany that we have laid out in this essay. Further, more concrete studies also need corresponding theories that address the fact that the GDR "was not a homogenous, socially undifferentiated society, but a fragmented one marked by deep divisions and ruptures."[99] Along these lines it would be useful to examine the existence of partial public spheres and their meaning in society, or to ask questions about the means by which political culture was reproduced in the GDR. More empirical studies should also analyze the special nature of public spheres in East Germany that were subjected to constant restructuring and change.[100]

At the same time, the differences between various forms of the media need to be examined more carefully, particularly in terms of their relative acceptance or rejection within the population. Such studies could help to formulate a more precise historical understanding of the problem of modernity. For the case of the GDR, questions about how the characteristics of a pre-modern, monocratic society (such as immobility, homogeneity, conservatism) could and did interact with the modern characteristics of an industrial society (differentiation, mass production, mass communication and mobilization of the masses in the service of an abstract vision of the future) would be extremely useful.[101]

And finally, the role and mentality of those actors involved in this system need to be explored more fully.[102] At present we believe that an approach combining the triad of structure, mechanisms, and agency offers the best possible method to gain new insights into the actual nature of East German communication and help us understand the specific institutional and individual spheres of media in the GDR.

Notes

1. Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR. Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 1945–1989* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 104.
2. Horst Möller, "Sind nationalsozialistische und kommunistische Diktaturen vergleichbar?" *Potsdamer Bulletin für Zeithistorische Studien* 2 (1994): 14.
3. Jürgen Kocka, "Nationalsozialismus und SED-Diktatur im Vergleich. Ein deutscher Sonderweg," in *Vereinigungskrise. Zur Geschichte der Gegenwart* (Göttingen, 1995), 93, and idem, "Überlegungen zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR," in ibid., 104.
4. Heiko Zeutschner, *Die braune Mattscheibe. Fernsehen im Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin,1995).
5. Gunter Holzweißig, *Zensur ohne Zensor. Die SED-Informationsdisktatur* (Bonn, 1997), 15.
6. Jürgen Wilke, "Medien DDR," *Fischer Lexikon Publizistik Massenkommunikation*, ed. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann et al. (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), 219–44; Wolfgang Mühl-Benninghaus, "Medienpolitische Probleme in Deutschland zwischen 1945 und 1989," in *Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit.... 40 Jahre DDR-Medien,* ed. Heide Riedel (Berlin, 1993), 9–20.
7. Gunter Holzweißig, *Zensur ohne Zensor*, and Peter Strunk, *Zensur ohne Zensoren. Medienkontrolle und Propagandapolitik unter sowjetischer Besatzungsmacht in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1996).
8. The establishment of separate boards for both television and radio in 1968 reflected the growing importance of television.
9. Konrad Dussel, "Die Sowjetisierung des DDR-Rundfunks in den fünfziger Jahren. Die Organisation des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees und seine Leitungstätigkeit," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenshaft* 45 (1997): 992–1016.
10. Adelheid von Saldern and Inge Marßolek, eds, *Zuhören und Gehörtwerden (II). Radio in der DDR zwischen Lenkung und Ablenkung* (Tübingen, 1998).
11. Ansgar Diller, "Der Rundfunk als Herrschaftsinstrument in der DDR," in *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission, "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED–Diktatur,"* ed. Deutscher Bundestag (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), Vol II: 1214–42.
12. Holzweißig, *Zensur ohne Zensor*, 124–26.
13. Brigitte Klump, *Das rote Kloster. Als Zögling in der Kaderschmiede der Stasi,* 2nd ed. (Munich, 1991).
14. Stefan Pannen, *Die Weiterleiter. Funktion und Selbstverständnis ostdeutscher Journalisten* (Cologne, 1992), 32–34.
15. Arne Kapitza, *Transformation der ostdeutschen Presse. "Berliner Zeitung," "Junge Welt," und "Sonntag/Freitag" im Prozeß der deutschen Vereinigung* (Opladen, 1997), 65.

16. Pannen, *Die Weiterleiter*, 30–32.
17. Ulrich Bürger (alias: Ulrich Ginolas), *Das sagen wir natürlich so nicht! Donnerstags-Argus bei Herrn Geggel* (Berlin, 1990).
18. Post-publication censorship did occur at least partially in the agitation division and in the press division. This forged a link with more preventive measures.
19. Ansgar Diller, "Massenkommunikationsmittel im Klassenkampf. Der Staatssicherheitsdienst der DDR und die Medien," *Rundfunk und Geschichte* 20 (1994): 107–120, and Holzweißig, *Zensur*, 89–91.
20. Ibid., 94.
21. Siegfried Lokatis, "Vom Amt für Literatur und Verlagswesen zur Hauptverwaltung Verlagswesen im Ministerium für Kultur," in *Jedes Buch ein Abenteuer. Zensursystem und literarische Öffentlichkeiten in der DDR bis Ender der sechziger Jahre*, ed. Simone Barck, Martina Langermann, and Siegfried Lokatis (Berlin, 1997), 19–36.
22. Ernst Wichner and Herbert Wiesner, eds, *Ausstellungsbuch Zensur in der DDR. Geschichte, Praxis und 'Ästhetik' der Behinderung von Literaur* (Berlin, 1991).
23. Simone Barck, "Leseland als Auslaufmodell – ein Workshop am ZZF Potsdam," in *Potsdamer Bulletin* 8 (1996): 47; and Gerhard Dahne, "Vom Blick über die Mauer," in *Das Loch in der Mauer. Der innerdeutsche Literaturaustausch*, ed. Mark Lehmstedt and Siegfried Lokatis (Wiesbaden, 1997), 311.
24. Simone Barck, Martina Langermann, and Siegfried Lokatis, "Die DDR – eine verhinderte Literaturgesellschaft?" in *Die DDR als Geschichte, Fragen – Hypothesen – Perspektiven*, ed. Jürgen Kocka and Martin Sabrow (Berlin, 1994), 155.
25. Gunter Holzweißig, ed., "DDR-Presse unter Parteikontrolle. Kommentierte Dokumentation," ed. Gesamtdeutsches Institut, Bundesanstalt für gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, *Analysen und Berichte* no. 3 (1991): 122–39.
26. Thomas Heimann, "DEFA, Künstler und SED Kulturpolitik. Zum Verhältnis von Kulturpolitik und Filmproduktion in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1959," *Beiträge zur Film- und Fernsehwissenschaft,* vol 46: 89–183.
27. Roland Reck, *Wasserträger des Regimes. Rolle und Selbstverständnis von DDR–Journalisten vor und nach der Wende 1989/90* (Münster, 1995), 325.
28. Joseph E. Naftzinger, *Policy-Making in the German Democratic Republic: The Response to the West German Trans-Border Television Broadcasting* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1994).
29. Similar situations have not occurred in those areas where cultural barriers are non-existent – North and South Korea, for instance, have different television broadcasting systems.
30. Kurt R. Hesse, "Ständiges Puzzlespiel. Tele-Visionen und persönliche Erfahrungen prägten die ostdeutschen Vorstellungen vom Westen," *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spiegel der DDR–Medien*, ed. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Bonn, 1997), 37–40.
31. Christa Braumann, "Fernsehforschung zwischen Parteilichkeit und Objektivität. Zur Zuschauerforschung in der ehemaligen DDR," *Rundfunk und Fernsehen* 42 (1994): 526f.
32. Peter Hoff, "Organisation und Programmentwicklung des DDR–Fernsehens," in *Institution, Technik und Programm. Rahmenaspekte der Programmgeschichte des Fernsehens*, ed. Knut Hickethier (Munich, 1993), 246.
33. Ibid., 246.
34. See the figures in Kurt R. Hesse, *Westmedien in der DDR. Nutzung, Image und Auswirkungen bundesrepublikanischen Hörfunk und Fernsehens* (Cologne, 1988), 128.
35. Günter Bentele, Otfried Jarren, Dieter Storll, "Elektronische Medien in Berlin (West) – Interesse und Nutzung," in *Der SFB in der Berliner Medienlandschaft.*

Eine Bestandsaufnahme, ed. Sender Freies Berlin (Berlin 1986), 31, quoted in Hesse, *Westmedien,* 129.

36. Christoph Classen, "'Guten Abend und Auf Wiederhören.' Faschismus und Anti-faschismus in Hörfunkkommentaren der frühen DDR," in *Verwaltete Vergangenheit. Geschichtskultur und Herrschaftslegitimation in der DDR,* ed. Martin Sabrow (Leipzig, 1997), 237–55.

37. Peter Hoff, *Organisation,* 245.

38. Thomas Beutelschmidt, *Sozialistische Audiovision. Zur Geschichte der Medienkultur in der DDR* (Potsdam, 1995), 105–7.

39. Peter Hoff, "Die Jahre der Unschuld. Zur Vor- und Frühgeschichte des Deutschen Fernsehfunks/Fernsehens der DDR," *Rundfunk und Fernsehen* 42 (1994): 555–80.

40. Peter Hoff, *Organisation,* 269.

41. Susanne Pollert, "Wo Licht ist, fällt auch Schatten. Das zeitkritische Magazin 'Prisma' im Kontext der DDR-Fernsehgeschichte," in *Zwischen Service und Propaganda. Zur Geschichte und Ästhetik von Magazinsendungen im Fernsehen der DDR 1952–1991,* ed. Helmut Heinze and Anja Kreutz (Berlin 1998), 18.

42. The "Black Channel" (1960 to 1989) was a program that tried to prove to viewers in the East that Western reporting was systematically manipulated and falsified.

43. Thilo Koch, "Westlicher Blick," *Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit,* ed. Heide Riedel, 125–29.

44. Kurt R. Hesse, "Fernsehen und Revolution. Zum Einfluß der Westmedien auf die politische Wende in der DDR," *Rundfunk und Fernsehen* 38 (1990): 331.

45. Georg Schütte, "ABC-Berichterstattung. Das Bild der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der 'Aktuellen Kamera'," *Die Bundesrepublik Detuschland im Spiegel der DDR-Medien,* ed. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 9–25.

46. Stefan Heym, "Je voller der Mund, desto leerer die Sprüche. Leben mit der Aktuellen Kamera," *So durften wir glauben zu kämpfen… Erfahrungen mit DDR-Medien,* ed. Edith Spielhagen (Berlin, 1993), 93–100. Cf. Odilio Gudorf, *Sprache als Politik. Untersuchung zur öffentlichen Sprache und Kommunikationsstruktur in der DDR* (Cologne, 1981), 133.

47. Gerhard Gmel, Susanne Deimling, and Jürgen Bortz, "Die Nutzung des Mediums Fernsehen in der DDR vor und nach der Wende," *Rundfunk und Fernsehen* 42 (1994): 542–54.

48. Jürgen Wilke and Stefan Sartoris, "Radiopropaganda durch Geheimsender der DDR im Kalten Krieg," *Pressepolitik und Propaganda. Historische Studien vom Vormärz bis zum Kalten Krieg,* ed. Jürgen Wilke (Cologne, 1997), 285–382.

49. Rolf Geserick, "Wettkampf der Systeme. Hörfunk und Fernsehen in der DDR von 1952 bis 1989," *ARD-Jahrbuch 91,* ed. ARD (Hamburg, 1991), 44–55.

50. Hans Poerschke, "Gedanken zur Journalismus-Konzeption der SED in den fünfziger Jahren," *Ansichten zur Geschichte der DDR,* ed. Dietmar Keller et al. (Bonn, 1993), vol. 1, 237–55.

51. Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten. Freizeit, Massenmedien und "Zeitgeist" in der Bundesrepublik der fünfziger Jahre* (Hamburg, 1995), 222.

52. Rolf Geserick, *40 Jahre Presse, Rundfunk und Kommunikationspolitik in der DDR* (Munich, 1989), 41ff.

53. Naftzinger, *Policy Making,* 300f.

54. Schütte, "ABC Berichterstattung," 15. See also Peter Ludes, "Das Fernsehen als Herrschaftsinstrument der SED," in *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission,* vol. 2, no. 4: 2195–217.

55. Schütte, "ABC Berichterstattung," 23.

56. Braumann, "Fernsehforschung," 536, 541.

57. P. Palmgreen, L. A. Wenner, and K. E. Rosengren, "Uses and Gratifications Research: The Past Ten Years," *Media Gratificatons Research,* ed. P. Palmgreen, L. A. Wenner, and K. E. Rosengren (Beverly Hills, 1985).

58. Gmel, Deimling, and Bortz, "Die Nutzung," 553f. Cf. Doris Rosenstein, "Zuschauer als Partner. Ratgebersendungen im DDR-Fernsehen," in *Zwischen Service und Propaganda,* 402.

59. Ibid., 550.

60. Alf Lüdtke, " 'Helden der Arbeit' – Mühen beim Arbeiten. Zur mißmutigen Loyalität von Industriearbeitern in der DDR," *Sozialgeschichte der DDR,* ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Jürgen Kocka, and Hartmut Zwahr (Stuttgart, 1994), 188–213; and Jürgen Kocka, "Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft," in ibid., 547–53.

61. Simone Barck, Martina Langermann, and Jörg Requate, "Kommunikative Strukturen, Medien und Öffentlichkeit in der DDR. Dimensionen und Ambivalenzen," *Berliner Debatte. Initial* 4/5 (1995): 27.

62. Peter Hohendahl, "Recasting the Public Sphere," *Octobre 73* (1995): 45.

63. David Bathrick, *The Powers of Speech. The Politics of Culture in the GDR* (Lincoln, 1995), 34.

64. Marc Silberman, "Problematizing the 'Socialist Public Sphere': Concepts and Consequences," *What Remains? East German Culture and the Postwar Public,* ed. idem (Wisconsin, 1997), 1–37.

65. Jürgen Gerhards and Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlichkeit," *Öffentlichkeit, Kultur, Massenkommunikation,* ed. Stefan Müller–Dohm and Klaus Neumann–Braun (Oldenbourg, 1991), 40.

66. Antonia Grunenberg, "Bewußtseinslagen und Leitbilder in der DDR," *Deutschland Handbuch. Eine doppelte Bilanz 1949–1989,* ed. Werner Weidenfeld and Hartmut Zimmermann (Bonn, 1989), 221; and Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft,* 309f, 428.

67. Roland Reck, "Wasserträger des Regimes," and Klaus Polkehn, *Das war die Wochenpost. Geschichte und Geschichten einer Zeitung* (Berlin, 1997). See Kapitza, *Transformation der ostdeutschen Presse,* passim; Ulriche Kluge, Steffen Birkefeld, and Silvia Müller, *Willfährige Propagandisten. MfS und Bezirksparteizeitungen: Berliner Zeitung, Sächsische Zeitung, Neuer Tag* (Stuttgart, 1997).

68. Alex Demirovic, *Demokratie und Herrschaft. Aspekte kritischer Gesellschaftstheorie* (Münster, 1997), 181.

69. Günter Feist, Eckhardt Gillen, and Beatrice Vierneisel, eds, *Kunstdokumentation SBZ/DDR 1945–1990. Aufsätze, Berichte, Materialien* (Berlin, 1996).

70. Ralph Hammerthaler, "Die Position des Theaters in der DDR," *Theater in der DDR. Chronik und Positionen,* ed. Christa Hasche, Traute Schölling, and Joachim Fiebach (Berlin, 1994), 246–55.

71. Axel Geiss, *Repression und Freiheit. DEFA-Regisseure zwischen Fremd- und Selbstbestimmung,* ed. Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (Potsdam, 1997).

72. Neimann, *DEFA, Künstler und SED-Kulturpolitik,* 255–322.

73. Christiane Mückenberger, ed., *"Prädikat besonders schädlich." Filmtexte mit Vorwort und einem dokumentaren Anhang* (Berlin, 1990); Joshua Feinstein, *The Triumph of the Ordinary. Depictions of Daily Life in the East German Cinema 1956–1966* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, 1995).

74. Klaus Wischnewski, "Die zornigen jungen Männer von Babelsberg," *Kahlschlag. Das 11. Plenum des ZK der SED. Studien und Dokumente,* ed. Günter Agde (Berlin, 1991), 171–88.

75. Klaus Wischnewski, "Träumer und gewöhnliche Leute," and Elke Schieber, "Anfang vom Ende oder Kontinuität des Argwohns," in *Das zweite Leben der Filmstadt Babelsberg. DEFA–Spielfilme 1946–1992,* ed. Filmmuseum Potsdam

(Berlin 1994), 212–63 and 264–327. Cf. Wolfgang Haible, *Schwierigkeiten mit der Massenkultur. Zur kulturtheoretischen Diskussion massenmedialer Unterhaltung in der DDR seit den siebziger Jahren* (Mainz, 1993), 15–41.

76. Eduard Schreiber, "Zeit der verpaßten Möglichkeiten 1970–1980," *Schwarzweiß und Farbe. DEFA-Dokumentarfilme 1946–92*, ed. Filmmuseum Potsdam (Berlin, 1994), 128–79. See also Wilhelm Roth, "Dokumentaristen. Wege zur Wirklichkeit," *Film in der DDR*, ed. Peter W. Jansen and Wolfram Schütte (Munich, 1977), 167–202.

77. Günter Jordan, "Von Perlen und Kieselsteinen. Der DEFA-Dokumentarfilm von 1946 bis Mitte der fünfziger Jahre," *Deutschlandbilder Ost*, ed. Peter Zimmermann, 61f. See also Filmmuseum Potsdam, ed., *Schwarzweiß und Farbe*.

78. Käthe Rülicke-Weiler in *Film- und Fernsehkunst der DDR*, ed. Hochschule für Film und Fernsehen (Berlin, 1979), 197–214; and Inge Münz-Koenen, *Fernsehdramatik – Experimente – Methoden – Tendenzen* (Berlin, 1974), 49–61.

79. Hans Müncheberg, "Zur Geschichte der Fernsehdramatik in der DDR," in *Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit*, ed. Heide Riedel, 101.

80. Heinz Kersten, "Enwicklungslinien," in *Film in der DDR*: 7–56, esp. 44. Cf. Lothar Bisky and Dieter Wiedemann, *Der Spielfilm. Rezeption und Wirkung. Kultursoziologische Analysen* (Berlin, 1985).

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86. "Filmspiegel," 22 (1986): 30.

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94. Klaus Polkehn, *Wochenpost*, 240–42.

95. Arne Kapitza, *Transformation*, 32.

96. Rudolf Reinhardt, *Zeitungen und Zeiten. Journalist im Berlin der Nachkriegszeit* (Cologne, 1988), 161–76.

97. Walter Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit. Drei Studien zur Kunstsoziologie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963).

98. Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft*, 15.

99. See Detlef Pollack, chapter two in this volume. Cf. Modernität und Modernitätsblockaden. See Pollack, "Religion und gesellschaftlicher Wandel," in *Der*

Zusammenbruch der DDR, ed. Hans Jonas und Martin Kohli (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), 246–49.

100. Marc Silberman, "Problematizing," 1.

101. Ibid., 17.

102. Roland Reck's work, based on interviews, allows a reconstruction of the motivation and perceptions of participants, but his comparison of the GDR and the Third Reich, by examining the "Wochenpost" and "Das Reich," also points to the problems inherent in such an approach.